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THE CONCEPT OF A UNIFIED
COURT SYSTEMt
Allan Ashman* and Jeffrey A. Parness**
The ever-increasing workload of the various state court systems has re-
cently generated a widespread interest in the possible mechanisms for court
reform. The concept of the unified court system has been and will continue
to be one of the prime vehicles for achieving meaningful court reform. The
authors herein review the history of this concept, outline its basic principles,
and assess its future role.
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INCE the turn of the century, the concept of a unified court
system has been pivotal in nearly every attempt to restructure
and reorganize America's trial courts. Although the concept is
not unfamiliar to persons involved in court modernization, its precise
meaning remains elusive. This Article seeks to shed some light on
the meaning of the concept. The discussion is divided into three
segments: a review of the historical and present-day thinking about
the concept; an examination of the basic tenets that generally are be-
lieved to be embodied in the concept; and an analysis of the concept's
significance with respect to the future administration of justice in
America. Hopefully, the ensuing discussion will serve to eliminate
some of the current confusion surrounding the meaning of the con-
cept and to spur further thought, debate, and implementation of the
concept's basic principles.
The concept of a unified court system describes neither a particu-
lar state court system nor a specific type of state court system.
Rather, it characterizes a state court system wherein the courts are
organized and managed in such a way as to provide, as nearly as
possible, a uniform administration of justice throughout that state.
It is conceivable that court systems which appear dissimilar may all
be denominated as "unified."
Much of the discussion of the unified court concept will be con-
fined to a consideration of state trial courts. A discussion of the role
of intermediate state appellate courts, courts of last resort, and fed-
eral courts within the unified court concept is deferred for subse-
quent analysis.'
THE UNIFIED COURT CONCEPT:
A REVIEW OF PAST AND PRESENT THINKING
Origins of the Concept
Generally, it is agreed that the concept of a unified court system
was introduced into this country's legal thinking by Roscoe Pound
in an address delivered at the 1906 annual convention of the Ameri-
1. For a discussion of the concept of court unification as it currently relates to
state appellate courts, see Guittard, Unifying the Texas Appellate Courts, 37 TEXAS
B.J. 317 (1974).
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can Bar Association in St. Paul, Minnesota.2  Pound's speech
dealt with the causes of public dissatisfaction with the administration
of civil justice in America. As one of the major causes of public
dissatisfaction, Pound cited the "archaic" nature of American judicial
organization and procedure.' He stated that the nation's court
systems were deficient in three major respects: First, in their multi-
plicity of courts; second, in preserving concurrent jurisdictions; and
third, in the inherent waste of judicial power. "The judicial organ-
izations of the several states exhibit many differences of detail," he
noted, "but. . .agree in these three respects."4
To eradicate the displeasure and inconvenience caused by poor
court organization and procedure, Pound suggested that states adopt
various principles of court unification. The cornerstone of his ap-
proach was the consolidation of all state appellate and trial courts
into one Supreme Court of Judicature with two branches-a court
of first instance and a court of appeal. According to Pound, such
a consolidation would have the following salutory effects: help focus
the judiciary's attention on litigants' causes of action rather than on
techniques of appellate procedure; greatly reduce case dismissals be-
cause of errors in the choice of forums; and lessen the "waste" of
judicial manpower by eliminating much of the idleness and unneces-
sary retrials.
These ideas were not original. Pound drew heavily from the En-
glish Judicature Act of 1873. Pound's contribution was to relate
prior English experience to the needs of the American justice sys-
2. Pound's address was entitled The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, and is reprinted in 46 J. AM. Jul. Soc'Y 55 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as Pound]. Years later, Dean Wigmore referred to the address as
"the spark that kindled the white flame of high endeavor, now spreading through
the entire legal profession and radiating the spirit of resolute progress in the ad-
ministration of justice." Wigmore, The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of
Progress-Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906, 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 50 (1962). For
an excellent account of Pound's role in promoting the concept of unified courts in
America, see Lowe, Unified Courts in America: The Legacy of Roscoe Pound,
56 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 316 (1973).
3. Pound, supra note 2, at 62. The other causes cited were (1) causes for
dissatisfaction with any legal system, (2) causes lying in the peculiarities of our
Anglo-American legal system, and (3) causes lying in the environment of our judicial
administration. Id. at 56.
4. Id. at 62.
5. 1d. at 62-63,
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tem.6 Despite his apparent disappointment over England's refusal
to implement fully the ideas contained in its own Judicature Act,7
Pound looked to the act as a model for future judicial organization
in America.
Although Pound's address was the first major pronouncement to
the legal profession on the potential adaptability of the unified court
concept to American courts, at the time of the speech at least one
American court, the Municipal Court in Chicago, already had em-
braced several underlying components of the concept. The institu-
tion of this court in 1906 was later hailed by Pound as "a distinct
advance in judicial organization in America." Specifically, Pound
cited the fact that the court had an administrative head with power
to control its administrative agencies, utilize its personnel for the
speedy disposition of business, and adjust its organization periodically
to meet existing workloads. Pound also praised the fact that the
court was given full power to make rules of procedure and was not
hampered by detailed legislative provisions as to practice.8
Pound's analysis of the effects of poor court organization and pro-
cedure remains sound today, and many American state court systems
remain "archaic." Although most judges, legislators, and commenta-
tors agree that the dissatisfaction noted by Pound still exists and that
the unified court concept can help to alleviate it, no general consen-
6. Although such an application of the English experience to American court
systems may seem at first to be a rather minor development in this country's history
of judicial administration, a complete understanding of the circumstances surround-
ing Pound's speech leads one to the opposite conclusion. Dean Wigmore, who him-
self was present for the St. Paul speech, saw it as "the catechism for all progressive-
minded lawyers and judges;" yet he reported that the speech was initially received
with "resentment" and "astoniment". Wigmore, supra note 2, at 52-53. Shortly
after the speech was given, James D. Andrews of New York addressed the A.B.A.
convention as follows:
Now, I want to say that however much we might admire parts of the paper,
a more drastic attack upon the system of procedure employed by the courts
in the United States, as a whole and in toto, could scarcely be devised ...
I will undertake to show the contrary of every one of the material positions
taken in the paper. . . . 29 A.B.A. REP. PT. I, at 12-13 (1906).
7. Pound, supra note 2, at 63.
8. Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV.
302, 313 n.29 (1913). Problems did remain in the judicial administration in
Chicago. In this same essay, Pound illustrated how a single family dispute could
lead to adjudication in four separate courts in Chicago at the same time-the juvenile
court, a court of equity, a court of law, and the criminal court or domestic relations
court. Id. at 313.
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sus has yet been reached on what constitute the basic elements of
the unified court concept.
National Municipal League Model
Since 1906, several model judicial articles have been drafted and
have served as guidelines for those hoping to establish more effective
court systems. Although they all called for court unification and for
more efficient and just judicial systems, ,these articles varied widely
in their descriptions of what actually is embodied in a model court
system. Similar differences were reflected in the content of court
studies and legal commentaries on the subject of court unification.
One of the earliest model judicial articles seeking to promote court
unification for state court systems was published by the American
Judicature Society in 1920.' The article was drafted at the request
of the National Municipal League and was submitted to its Commit-
,tee on State Government.' 0 According to this model, court unifi-
cation could be best accomplished by general amendments to a
state's constitution together with a schedule of legislation comple-
menting the new constitutional provisions."
This approach was based on two major premises. First, the So-
ciety felt that, generally, the state courts were poorly administered.
In introducing its model article, the Society stated:
Valid complaint of the courts is largely directed to the administrative side
of the judicial function. In a final analysis, it means that the courts do
not employ businesslike methods for doing what is actually judicial business.
The judicial system . . . is composed of a large number of separate units
with no sufficient means for coordinating their effort . . . . It is, in fact,
an extensive institution without a brain,12
9. The final draft of the model article appears in Draft Judiciary Article, 3
J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 132, 135 (1920). Earlier versions of this article appeared in
print in October, 1914 and in March, 1917. The State-Wide Judicature Act, I
J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 101 (1917). It should be noted that much of the Society's
thinking about unification was influenced by an earlier A.B.A. committee report
which discussed state court unification. The A.B.A. report appears in 34 A.B.A.
REP. 578, 589-95 (1909). The Society recognized the 1909 A.B.A. report as the
work where "the conception of the unified state court system first received adequate
expression." The State-Wide Judicature Act, supra at 101.
10. Editorial, 3 J. AM. Jun. Soc'v 131, 132 (1920).
11. From our research, it seems that almost all individual state attempts to
unify their court systems have followed this theory.
12. Model Judiciary Article: Introduction, 3 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 132 (1920).
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Second, the Society believed that state legislatures were not directing
the efforts of most state court systems properly. The Society cited
legislative attempts to direct court systems through legislation, thus
violating the separation of powers doctrine and restricting the admin-
istrative flexibility of the courts to meet their own needs.'" To alle-
viate this second defect, the Society incorporated into its idea of court
unification the principle of court control over its own practice and
procedure through the rule-making process.' 4
The Society's 1920 model article envisioned only three courts in
a state's judicial system-a supreme court to handle all appellate
business, a district court for "trials of all kinds,"' 5 and a county court
for the "special convenience of each separate county."'" The model
article placed the responsibility for managing all these courts in a
council of judges composed of representatives from the judges of the
three courts. Such responsibility included the exclusive power to
make rules of procedure for all three courts, to regulate all the minis-
terial officers of the three courts, to reduce the number of justices
of the peace, and to control the various calendars of cases and the
assignment of judges to special calendars.' 7
Several other features of the model act merit comment. For ex-
ample, while the judicial system was not to be wholly state-financed
unless the legislature so provided,' all court officers were to be paid
by the state' 9 with all fees and fines going to the state. 20  At least
13. Id. at 132-33.
14. Id. at 133.
15. Id. The model article does permit some appellate jurisdiction in the district
court in cases appealed from the county court. The article recognizes that "appeals
from local courts present a difficult problem, one which has never been solved
satisfactorily." Draft Judiciary Article, supra note 9, § 7, at 136. It also allows
for a limitation on district court jurisdiction so that the problem of concurrent juris-
diction can be avoided. Id. In an earlier and more elaborate version of the model
act, the drafters referred to the district court as the superior court, and contemplated
that this second type of court would be organized into two divisions-a chancery,
probate, and domestic relations division and a common law division. Second Draft
of a State-Wide Judicature Act, BUtLLETIN VII-A OF THE AM. Jun. Soc'y, Appendix
A, 134-36 (Mar. 1917).
16. Model Judiciary Article: Introduction, supra note 12, at 133. See also
Draft Judiciary Article, supra note 9, § 1, at 135.
17. Draft Judiciary Article, supra note 9, at 134 and § 15, at 139.
18. Id. § 20, at 141.
19. Id.
20. ld. § 21, at 141.
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once a year, a meeting of all judges was to be held with separate
meetings of supreme court judges and district court judges required
quarterly.21  Court statistics would be collected centrally2 2 and the
judicial system's chief justice--chosen in a general election-would
have many administrative duties, such as publishing annual reports,
presiding over judicial council meetings, and presiding as the judicial
system's executive head. 23  The legislature was empowered to enact
laws in conflict with the article when requested by a majority of the
judicial council including the chief justice.24
The Society's model act subsequently was adopted by the National
Municipal League with only one modification, that concerning the
manner of judicial selection.25  The League supported the Society's
model until approximately 1937. During this time the Society's
model article was instrumental in the creation of several state judicial
councils, the return of much of the rule-making power to the state
courts, and in several other areas of judicial administration.26 How-
ever, by 1937 no state had approved the entire "ideal judicial arti-
cle," although several states, particularly Missouri, had made gen-
uine efforts to do so. 27  The Society reported in 1937 that since the
League adopted the model article, the League had "devoted its at-
tention mainly to city and county government and its model state con-
stitution has not received the publicity which its importance justi-
fies., 25
By 1942, the League had revised substantially the Society's model
article. The revision may well have been spurred by the actions of
the 1938 A.B.A. convention, which will be discussed later in this
21. Id. § 18, at 140.
22. Id. § 11, at 137. See also Model Judiciary Article: Introduction, supra
note 12, at 134.
23. Draft Judiciary Article, supra note 9, § 11, at 137. For an elaboration on
why the Society mandated that much of the court system's administrative tasks be
the chief justice's responsibility, see Second Draft of a State-Wide Judicature Act,
supra note 15, § 4 and the subsequent commentary, at 7-9.
24. Draft Judiciary Article, supra note 9, § 22, at 141.
25. Id. § 10, at 137. Cf. Judiciary Article in Model State Constitution, 20
J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 189, § 60, at 191 (1937).




DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Article. The League's 1942 model constitution contained the
following major changes with respect to key elements in the unified
court concept. First, it placed the prime responsibility for the organ-
izational structure of the state judicial system and for its personnel in
the legislature. 21 Second, it weakened the constitutional powers of
the judicial council. For example, the council no longer had "exclu-
sive" rule-making power.30 Third, it altered the composition of the
judicial council by adding non-judicial representatives including lay-
men, lawyers, and a legislator."1
At least two of these three major changes drew heavy criticism
from the Society. With regard to structure, the Society continued
to urge explicit constitutional recognition of the district and county
court.32 As to the composition of judicial councils, the Society feared
that they might become dominated by their non-judicial members
if the new article was followed.33  With respect to the change in the
rule-making power, the Society simply stated that "the initial respon-
sibility is placed where it should be, in the judicial council." '34
Since 1942, the National Municipal League has published further
revisions of a model constitution. While these editions have held
consistently to the goal of court unification, they have not been as
firm in their descriptions of what constitute the major elements of
the unified court concept.
A 1948 revision indicated that the judicial power of the state "shall
be vested in a general court of justice, which shall include a supreme
court department and such other departments and subdivisions and
as many judges as may be provided by law.""5 An explanatory note
defended this broad outline by citing the need for flexibility. 0
29. Model Judiciary Article and Comment Thereon, 26 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 51,
§ 600, at 53 (1942).
30. Id. § 607, at 58.
31. Id. § 606, at 58.
32. Id., comment following § 600, at 53.
33. ld., comment following § 606, at 58.
34. ld., comment following § 607, at 58-59.
35. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE COMM. ON STATE GOV'T, MODEL STATE CON-
sTrrUTION WIr EXPLANATORY NOTES 10 (5th ed. 1948). This, incidentally, was
quite similar to the 1942 edition. Model Judiciary Article and Comment Thereon,
supra note 29, § 600, at 53. Yet it is quite different from the 1920 edition. Draft
Judiciary Article, supra note 9, § 1, at 135.
36. MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 35,
art. V1, at 36.
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But a 1962 revision stated that the judicial power of the state
"shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a
supreme court, an appellate court and a general court, and which
shall also include such inferior courts of limited jurisdiction as may
from time to time be established by law."'s7  The commentary to this
revision noted that it represented "no break" in policy with the
League's long established position in support of a unified and flex-
ible judicial system. According to the League, the draft merely re-
flected elaborations or modifications of principles established earlier,
on the basis of additional experience.8"
Other important changes were made in the 1962 edition of the
League's model judicial article. First, the constitutional provision for
a judicial council was omitted.8" Second, the article called for state
financing of the entire judicial system.4" Third, the rule-making
power was placed in the supreme court, subject to legislative change
by a two-thirds vote of the members.41
The A.B.A.'s Position on the Unified Court Concept
Like the American Judicature Society and the National Municipal
League, the American Bar Association consistently has acknowl-
edged the importance of the unified court concept in American judi-
dicial administration. The A.B.A. also has changed its position pe-
riodically with respect to the components of the unified court con-
cept.
The A.B.A.'s first major action concerning the concept came in
a 1909 report of its Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and For-
mulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in
37. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, § 6.01, at 15-
16 (6t, ed. 1962).
38. Id., introductory comment to art. VI, at 77.
39. Id., art. VI, at 15-19.
40. Id. § 6.06, at 19. This section reads: "The chief judge shall submit an
annual consolidated budget for the entire unified judicial system, and the total cost
of the system shall be paid by the state. The legislature may provide by law for
reimbursement to the state of appropriate portions of such cost by political sub-
divisions."
41. Id. § 6.07, at 19. The Executive Director of the National Municipal League
has stated that the sixth edition of the League's Model State Constitution is the cur-
rent edition. Letter from William N. Cassella, Jr. to Jeffery A. Parness, Apr. 17,
1974, on file with the American Judicature Society.
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Litigation. Although the specific portion of the report dealing with
the concept never actually came to the floor of the 1909 A.B.A. con-
vention for a vote,42 its contents greatly influenced early thinking on
court unification in America.4
The Special Committee examined the problem of expense and de-
lay in the administration of justice and found there were essentially
four main "factors" in the subject of judicial administration, including
judicial organization and the law of procedure.44 While the Special
Committee felt it was inappropriate at that time to draft detailed leg-
islative proposals on the subject, it did develop principles to guide
legislators as to the advisability of drafting legislation in the area of
judicial administration and on the scope of such legislation."
The Committee's first principle was that the entire judicial power
of a state, at least for civil causes, should be vested in one "Great
Court," of which all tribunals should be branches, departments, or
divisions. "The business as well as the judicial administration of this
court," the committee noted, "should be thoroughly organized so as
to prevent not merely waste of judicial power, but all needless
clerical work, duplication of papers and records, and the like, thus
obviating expense to litigants and cost to the public."4
Elaborating on this principle, the Committee pointed out that the
Great Court should be organized in three chief branches: county
courts (including municipal courts), having exclusive jurisdiction of
all petty causes; a superior court of first instance, having two or three
divisions;4  and a single court of appeals.4 One high official of the
42. The only mention of the report's sub-division on unified courts came when
Charles A. Boston of New York called the desirability of unifying courts to the
attention of the A.B.A. membership and urged fellow members to promote unifica-
tion proposals such as the one currently before the New Jersey voters. The New
Jersey proposal was described as providing for a single court divided into three de-
partments: one of appeal, one of law and one of equity. Boston concluded by
calling the concept of unification "the greatest step in advance of judicial organiza-
tion that I know to have been taken in this country at any time." 34 A.B.A. REP.
85 (1909).
43. See note 9 supra.
44. The other two factors were "the personnel, mode of choice and tenure of
judges, and ...the organization, training and traditions of the Bar." 34 A.B.A.
RP. 588 (1909).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 589.
47. The three divisions were law, equity, and "probate, administration, guardian-
ship and the like." Id. at 589.
48. Id. at 589-90.
[Vol. 24:1
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM
court was designated to have administrative responsibility in matters
such as judicial and case assignment.4" The Committee believed
that this organizational scheme presented the best opportunity for
effective court administration."0
The Committee's second principle was that procedural details
should be left to rules of court instead of being prescribed by legis-
lative action.5' According to the Committee, statutes should deal
only with the general features of procedure and prescribe the gen-
eral lines to be followed, leaving details to be fixed by rules of court.
The courts could change these details as actual experience of their
application and operation dictated. 2
The Committee's rationale for this position was that pleading and
practice were originally the work of courts, and that it was a mistake
for legislators to delve into their minute details. The Committee
noted that
[a] statute going into minute detail to begin with, soon to be swollen by leg-
islative additions and overgrown with amendments and a gloss of judicial de-
cisions, is not the practice act of the future. The ideal would be a clear
and scientific outline, of say one hundred sections, laying out the limits and
lines of procedure to be developed by rules of court which may be enacted,
revised, amended, or abrogated by experts as exigencies of judicial adminis-
tration demand.58
In other areas, the Committee sought to give power to appellate
courts to take further evidence54 and also sought to abolish the fee
system wherever it still existed.55
The next major A.B.A. action on the unified court concept did
not occur until 1938. At that time the A.B.A. House of Delegates
approved sixty-six resolutions submitted by its Section on Judicial
Administration.56 The American Judicature Society called this ac-
tion "the most important thing that has occurred in respect to civil
49. Id. at 590.
50. Id. at 593-95. For a discussion of the nine advantages the Committee saw
in its plan see pp. 26-27 infra.
51. Id. at 595.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 596-97.
54. Id. at 598.
55. Id. at 600.
56. 63 A.B.A. RFP. 522 (1938). See also 24 A.B.A.J. 685-786 (1938).
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procedure in our generation. '57
Several of these resolutions dealt with the elements of court unifi-
cation, calling for the courts to be given full rule-making power, 58
requiring quarterly judicial statistics,5" and declaring "that provision
should be made in each state for a unified judicial system with power
and responsibility in one of the judges to assign judges to judicial
service so as to relieve congestion of dockets and utilize the available
judges to the best advantage.""0 Other relevant resolutions held that
judicial councils be given additional powers, with representation on
them granted to members of the bar and of the judiciary committees
of the legislative department,6' and that appeals from inferior courts
by way of full re-trial in a higher court be avoided whenever pos-
sible. 2
Almost a quarter of a century passed before the A.B.A. once again
formally addressed itself to the concept.6 3  In 1962, a model state
judicial article, drafted by a committee of the A.B.A.'s Section on
Judicial Administration, 4 was adopted by the House of Delegates.
The announced purpose of this model article was the furtherance
of the administration of justice in all the courts of the several states.
The article was based specifically on the earlier 1938 resolutions stat-
ing certain minimum standards for judicial administration, 5 and its
provisions closely paralleled the content of the 1938 resolutions. 6
57. Standards of Judicial Administration Adopted, 22 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 66
(1938).
58. Recommendation (1) of the Comm. on lud. Adm., 63 A.B.A. REP. 523
(1938).
59. Recommendation (4) of the Comm. on Jud. Adm., 63 A.B.A. REP. 523
(1938).
60. Recommendation (2) oj the Comm. on Jud. Adm., 63 A.B.A. REP. 523
(1938).
61. Recommendation (3) of the Comm. on Jud. Adm., 63 A.B.A. REP. 523
(1938).
62. Recommendation (1) of the Comm. on App. Procedure, 63 A.B.A. REP.
527 (1938).
63. 87 A.B.A. REP. 132, 391 (1962).
64. Holt, Jr., The Model State Judicial Article in Perspective, 47 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'y 6, 8 (1963).
65. 87 A.B.A. REP. 391 (1962).
66. The text of the Model State Judicial Article with comments can be found
in 87 A.B.A. REP. 392-99 (1962) or in Text of the Model State Judicial Article,
47 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 8-12 (1962).
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The first provision of the 1962 article stated that the judicial power
of the state was to be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which
was to be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one
trial court of general jurisdiction called the district court, and one
trial court of limited jurisdiction called the magistrate's court.67 The
district court was to have as many divisions and the district court and
the magistrate's court were to have as many judges as the supreme
court believed necessary, except that each district was to be a geo-
graphic unit fixed by the supreme court and have at least one judge.
Every judge of the district and magistrate's courts would be eligible
to sit in every district.6 8 The district court was to exercise original
general jurisdiction in all cases, "except in so far as original jurisdic-
tion may be assigned exclusively to the magistrate's court by the su-
preme court rules." The district court also could be authorized to
review directly decisions of the magistrate's court.6 9
Concerning the power of the chief justice of the supreme court,
the article stated that he would be "the executive head of the judicial
system and shall appoint an administrator of the courts . . . to aid
the administration of the courts of the state." The chief justice could
assign any judge or magistrate to sit in any court in the state when
he deemed such assignment necessary. Under the direction of the
chief justice, the court administrator would prepare and submit to
the legislature the court's budget and would perform all other neces-
sary administrative functions relating to the courts. 70
With respect to rule-making, the article empowered the supreme
court to prescribe rules governing appellate jurisdiction, rules of prac-
tice and procedure, rules of evidence, and rules to govern bar admis-
sion and the discipline of members of the bar.71  The commentary
acknowledged both the possible use by the court of "a judicial coun-
cil or any other body of experts to advise it in the formulation of
67. 87 A.B.A. REP. 392 (1962). The Committee's comments to the provision
declared that the intent was to set up a single unified judicial system, and it also
recognized the need to provide for a possible intermediate appellate court because
of the state's experience since 1938 with the problem of congestion in the appellate
system. Id.
68. Id. § 4, para. 1, at 394.
69. Id. § 4, paras. 2-3, at 395.
70. Id. § 8, para. 2, at 397-98.
71. Id. § 9, at 398.
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rules,"'72 and the controversial nature of the decision to grant the
court power to prescribe rules of evidence.78
The A.B.A.'s 1962 model article varies in several respects from
earlier A.B.A. resolutions and particularly from other earlier model
constitutions. It provided for an administrator of the state courts
where a unified system is established, with much of the administra-
tive responsibility for the court system initially placed upon his
shoulders rather than upon those of the chief justice. 74  For ex-
ample, pursuant to the model article the major responsibility for pre-
paring the court system's budget rested constitutionally with the court
administrator.7 5 It made no provision for any form of judicial coun-
cil. It placed within the constitutional framework the form of trial
and limited courts, thus abandoning earlier calls for "flexibility. 76
And finally, it left the jurisdictional limits of courts of limited and
special jurisdiction to the discretion of the supreme court rather than
to the state legislature.77
While there appears to have been no major revisions of the A.B.A.
model judicial article since 1962, several major statements on state
court organization have been issued by the A.B.A. since that time.
When read in light of earlier A.B.A. positions, some of these sub-
sequent statements have been both contradictory and confusing.
Specifically, the A.B.A.'s Section on Judicial Administration pub-
lished in 1971 the fifth edition of a handbook entitled The Improve-
ment of the Administration of Justice.78 (Apparently the first edi-
tion was the 1938 report of the Section which included the sixty-
six resolutions. 79) Although the handbook acknowledged both the
A.B.A. and N.M.L. model judicial articles, 0 its chapter on court
structure made no specific comment on the ideal structure of a state
72. Id. § 9, Committee comment, at 398.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 8, para. 2, at 397-98.
75. Id.
76. See notes 36 and 37 supra.
77. See note 69 supra. Cf. notes 29 and 35 supra.
78. A.B.A. SECTION ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (5th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as JuDcII. ADMINIS-
TRATION].
79. McAllister, Foreword to THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE at xi (5th ed. 1971).
8Q. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 78, at 11 and App. B, at 156-64,
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court system."' It simply noted that states should have a simplified
court structure, and "that fragmentation of specialized and limited
jurisdiction of the courts in populous areas may impede the realiza-
tion of full judicial efficiency and contribute in some measure to con-
gestion and delay in the handling of certain categories of cases."'8 2
But another chapter in the handbook discussed needed improve-
ments in the limited and special jurisdiction courts, without mention-
ing either their consolidation into one trial court of general jurisdic-
tion, as many urged," or their consolidation into a single limited ju-
risdiction court, as the A.B.A.'s own 1962 model judicial article had
recommended. 8'
The 1971 handbook also discussed at some length "the essentials
of effective court administration." '  It defined court administration
as "the business-like management of the operation of the courts by
personnel trained for such duties."8' 6 Court administration was de-
scribed as most effective when a court employs both an administra-
tive judge(s) and a court administrator(s).8 7
With respect to rule-making, the handbook cited with approval the
A.B.A.'s 1938 resolution on the subject, 8 emphasizing that full rule-
making in the courts is essential to an efficient judicial system.8 9
The handbook also recommended the operation of both a judicial
council and a judicial conference in each state.9 0
In February 1974, the A.B.A.'s House of Delegates approved,
with only minor modifications, the final draft of its Commission on
Standards of Judicial Administration publication entitled Standards
Relating to Court Organization.1 The Commission's draft embodies
81. Id. at 7-11.
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. See text accompanying notes 3-7 and 115-18 supra.
84. See note 67 supra.
85. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 78, at 13-31.
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 17, 27.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 74.
90. Id. at 34, 41.
91. A.B.A. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION (Final Draft 1974) [hereinafter cited as STAND-
ARD OF JUOIcIAL ADMINISTraTION].
1974]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
by far the most comprehensive A.B.A. description of a model unified
court system. The initial standard defines the structure of the uni-
fied system as one which facilitates the selection and assignment of
competent judicial and auxiliary personnel, sound financial adminis-
tration, efficient use of manpower, facilities, and equipment, and
continuous planning for the future. 2  Subsequent standards set forth
the manner in which a state can achieve these goals.
Although recognizing its roots in such earlier A.B.A. works as the
1938 resolutions and the 1971 revised handbook,9 3 the Commission's
draft contains significant variations from these earlier efforts. In
commenting upon the major elements of the concept of a unified
court system, the draft states:
The structure of the court system should be simple, preferably consisting
of a trial court and an appellate court, each having divisions and depart-
ments as needed. The trial court should have jurisdiction of all cases and
proceedings. It should have specialized procedures and divisions to ac-
commodate the various types of criminal and civil matters within its juris-
diction. The judicial functions of the trial court should be performed by
a single class of judges, assisted by legally trained judicial officers .... The
administrative policy of the court system should be established by the judi-
ciary and administered under the direction of judges . . .(who) should par-
ticipate in ...judicial councils ...and judicial conferences . . . . The
courts should have authority to prescribe rules of procedure . . . . The fi-
nancial operations of the courts ...should be managed through a unified
budget that includes all courts in the system.9 4
In setting forth a two-tier court system with subdivisions within
each tier, this draft differs at least from the 1962 A.B.A. model ju-
dicial article. Most significantly, the 1974 draft's contemplated
structure includes ideally such characteristics as uniform jurisdiction,
simple jurisdictional divisions, uniform standards of justice, clearly
vested policy-making authority, and clearly established administra-
tive authority. 5 Still another illustration of the 1974 Commission's
break with the past can be found in the draft's provisions dealing
with "judicial officers assisting judges."9 6  The Commission's tenta-
92. Id. § 1.00, at 1.
93. Preface to STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91.
94. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.10, at 1-2.
95. Id. § 1.11, at 2-3. At least one astute observer had predicted five years
earlier that "one day the Model Judicial Article will be revised to provide for a
two-tier judicial structure." The Case for Two-Level State Court System, 50 J.
AM. JUD. Soc'Y 185, 186 (1967).
g6. $TANDA.pS of JUDICIAAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.26, at 50-52.
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tive draft had called these persons "commissioners, associate judges,
magistrates and similar officials. '9 7  In any event, the final draft
makes it clear that these officers would be under the control of the
judges, and that they may or may not be "parajudges. ''98
Other Positions
Along with the American Judicature Society, the National Munici-
pal League and the American Bar Association, many other groups
and individuals have addressed themselves to the concept of a uni-
fied court system. Though these other statements may not arise
from a long series of model articles and comments on the subject
or may specifically apply the topic to only a very localized area, they
have been quite influential in the gradual state movement toward
implementation of the key principles of the unified court concept.
Various national study groups and conferences have spoken on the
desirability of having unified state court systems. 99 One such pro-
nouncement came after the three day National Conference on the
Judiciary held in Williamsburg, Virginia in 1971, which was attended
by representatives of most national legal organizations and by several
of the country's leading judges, lawyers, and government officers.1"'
The final consensus statement of the conference declared, among
other things, that state courts should be organized into a unified ju-
dicial system, financed by state government and placed under the
supervisory control of the supreme court. 101 The statement under-
scored the need for a state-wide court administrator, for the su-
preme court to have the power to promulgate rules of procedure and
administration, and for only one level of trial courts.0 2 Also, the
97. A.B.A. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.10, at 2 (Tent. Draft 1973).
98. J. PARNESS, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE PARAJUDGE IN THE UNITED STATES,
AM. JuD. SuC'Y, RESEARCH REPORT No. 8 (Prelim. Draft 1973).
99. The multitude of such statements prohibits us from reviewing all those
which have been made. However, for a good survey of the dialogue, see F. Klein,
Annotated Bibliography (1971), reprinted at the end of NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN THE STATES (Mar. 11-14, 1971). See also the cita-
tions listed in the A.B.A.'s STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, supra
note 91, and in the National Advisory Cmmission's COURTS, infra note 105.
100. JUSTICE IN THE STATES, supra note 99. See also A. LOGAN, JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY (1973).
101. JUSTICE IN THE STATES, supra note 99, at 265.
102. Id. at 265-66.
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consensus statement urged greater and more effective use of para-
judicial personnel, 10 3 adding: "Civil and criminal matters which can
be better handled outside of the judicial system should be eliminated
from the jurisdiction of the courts.' ' 4  In general, the Williamsburg
consensus statement closely resembled the subsequent A.B.A. Stand-
ards Relating to Court Organization.
Recently, another such statement on the subject of court unifica-
tion was issued by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals.' While there is much that is similar
to previously cited positions, the Advisory Commission added several
rather original elements to its discussion of the concept of a unified
court system. For example, it excluded certain traffic violations
from the jurisdiction of the unified trial court, 1 6 stating that these
traffic violations "should be made infractions, subject to administra-
tive disposition.' 10 7 It included the possibility that, in light of the
experience with traffic matters, consideration might be given to simi-
lar treatment of certain non-traffic matters such as public drunken-
ness. 1 8 The National Advisory Commission also included in its call
for unified courts a mandate that certain services be unified, °9 de-
claring that pretrial release, probation and other rehabilitative serv-
ices should be available in all prosecutions within the jurisdiction
of the unified trial court." 0
Individual commentators also have influenced thinking on the uni-
fied court concept. For example, the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt's
Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration was a monumental
effort to explore the extent to which states had followed the A.B.A.'s
1938 standards."' Vanderbilt breathed life into the standards and
ultimately paved the way toward a greater understanding of the ac-
103. Id. at 265.
104. Id.
105. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS (1973).
106. Id. standard 8.1, at 164.
107. Id. standard 8.2, at 168.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 166.
110. Id. standard 8.1 at 164. See also Note, Administration of Pretrial Release
and Detention: A Proposal for Unification, 83 YALE L.J. 153, 178 (1973).




tual meaning of the unified court concept. Even Roscoe Pound
spurred new thoughts on the subject by elaborating on the general
ideas expressed in his earlier St. Paul address in a 1940 article.1 12
In addition, countless local studies and reports have been pro-
duced over the years relating the concept of unification to the needs
of a particular state or of a specific local trial court.118 Not surpris-
ingly, these reports differ widely as to what properly constitutes a
truly unified court system." 4
Self-Proclaimed Unified Court Systems
The foregoing review highlights the confusion and debate over
time about the meaning of the unified court concept. An examina-
tion of how some states perceive and individually apply the concept
today best illustrates the continuing differences with respect to the
meaning of court unification.
Currently, Illinois views its judicial system as a "model which
every state in the Union is attempting to emulate." 115 It claims to
have pioneered the unified trial court structure. 1 6 The Constitution
of 1970, under which the present Illinois court system is now operat-
ing, vests the judicial power in a "Supreme Court, an Appellate
Court, and Circuit Courts.""117  The circuit courts are trial courts of
general jurisdiction, and they have "original jurisdiction of all jus-
ticiable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and ex-
clusive jurisdiction."" 8
There are now twenty-one circuit courts operating in Illinois, with
the Circuit Court of Cook County being the largest. Apart from
112. Roscoe Pound and Court Unification, 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 172 (1940);
Pound, Principles and Outline of a Modern Unified Court Organization, 23 J. AM.
Jun. Soc'Y 225 (1940).
113. Note 99 supra.
114. Compare CITIZEN'S STUDY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION, RE-
PORT To GOVERNOR PATRICK J. LUCEY (Wis. 1973) with Booz, ALLEN, AND HA mH-
[ON, INC., FINAL REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA LOWER COURT STUDY (1971) and
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMM. OF THE N.Y. STATE
COURT SYSTEM pts. I, II, and III (1973).
115. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 9.
116. Id.




the Circuit Court of Cook County, which has jurisdiction over only
one county within the state, the circuit courts cover territorial areas
embracing anywhere from two to twelve counties. These courts are
manned by circuit judges and associate judges."1 9 The 1970 Con-
stitution vests in the supreme court general administrative and su-
pervisory authority over the circuit courts and over all other courts
in the system. This authority is constitutionally exercised by the
court's chief justice pursuant to the court's rules.'2 0 The court sys-
tem of Illinois is financed by state and county governments.' 2 The
Illinois Supreme Court has exercised complete rule-making power
for approximately the past twelve years even though legislative action
in the area appears technically possible.'
New York's constitution claims it too establishes a unified court
system for that state, but the composition of its system differs mark-
edly from the one in Illinois. The state-wide courts for New York
include the court of appeals, the supreme court including appellate
divisions, the court of claims, the county courts, the surrogate's court,
and the family court.'2 8 For the city of New York, as part of the
state's unified court system, there exists a single, city-wide court of
civil jurisdiction and a single, city-wide court of criminal jurisdic-
tion.' Outside the city of New York, the New York state unified
system encompasses district, town, city, and village courts.'2 5  The
court system in New York is under the direct administrative supervi-
sion of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference-con-
sisting of the chief judge of the court of appeals and of the four pre-
siding justices of the four appellate divisions.' 26 The court system
119. Id. §§ 7-8.
120. Id. § 16. The 1970 Constitution specifically mandates court action in one
area by stating that the "Court shall appoint an administrative director and staff"
to serve at its pleasure and to assist the chief justice; and it recognizes possible court
action in another area by declaring that the court "may assign a Judge temporarily
to any Court and an Associate Judge to serve temporarily as an Associate Judge on
any Circuit Court."
121. Id. § 14.
122. J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDy OF THE PROCEDURAL RuLE-MAIUNO
POWER IN THE U.S., AM. JuD. SOC'Y RESEARCH REP. 31-32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
PARNESS & KoRAKES].
123. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § I(a).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 28.
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is financed by state and local government,127 and the rule-making
power is exercised, in part, by the state legislature, the Judicial Con-
ference and the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference. 128
A recent study of the New York courts urged a drastic reorganization
of the state's present court system. 12 9
Recent constitutional changes also claim to have established a uni-
fied court system in North Carolina "for purposes of jurisdiction, op-
eration and administration."' 0  The judicial power is vested in a
single General Court of Justice,' 3 ' which itself is separated into three
divisions-appellate, superior court, and district court. 8 2  The ap-
pellate division consists of a supreme court and a court of appeals.'8 3
Supervision of the state's court system lies, at least in part, with the
chief justice of the supreme court.13 1 State and local govern-
ments finance the system." 5 The supreme court and the state's gen-
eral assembly share the rule-making authority, but most of the rules
originate from the court.136
Other states also claim to have established unified court systems.
However, upon close examination of all these court systems, crucial
differences between them can be detected. Most often dissimilar-
ities occur with respect to the number of different trial and appel-
late courts within the system, the manner of court financing, the ex-
ercise of administrative and/or supervisory power over the entire sys-
tem, and the rule-making authority.
Court Unification as an Evolutionary Concept
While important differences exist between the court systems of
127. Id. § 29.
128. PARNESS & KoRBAKES, supra note 122, at 48.
129. ANn JUSTICE FOR ALL, REPORT OF THE TEMPORARy COMM. OF THE
N.Y. STATE COURT SYSTEM pt. I, ch. 1, at 7-17 (1973). The Report has been re-
ferred to as the Dominick Commission Report, after its chairman, D. Clinton
Dominick.
130. N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
131. Except, that is, for the court for the trial of impeachments. Id. §§ 1, 2, 4.
132. Id. § 2. The superior court is the state trial court of general jurisdiction.
Id. § 12(3). The district court is the state trial court of limited jurisdiction. Id.
§ 12(4).
133. Id. § 5.
134. Id. § 11.
135. Id. § 20.
136. PA NESS & KosBAKEs, supra note 122, at 49.
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the several self-proclaimed "unified" states, a closer examination of
the court system of any one of these states reveals that the same
"unified court system" label has been applied continuously even
though the structure and administration of that particular state's court
system has varied significantly over time. While some of the varia-
tions are minor, others are crucial to the operation and effectiveness
of the system. Illinois is a good example.
Although the concept of the unified court system has been touted
for some time, its actual implementation has occurred primarily
within the past few years and in only a few states. 187  Illinois was
the first jurisdiction to establish a state court system containing most
of the major principles of the unified court concept. 188 The current
Illinois court system actually took effect in January, 1964. However,
its structure and operation have often been modified since then by
both constitutional and statutory amendments." 9 For example,
since 1964, the constitution has been modified so as to eliminate the
office of magistrate of the circuit court, 140 and to expand both
the assignment powers of the supreme court over circuit and as-
sociate judges' and the supreme court's supervisory authority.'42
In addition, numerous statutory amendments have been adopted to
coordinate legislative acts with constitutional provisions and to imple-
ment constitutional mandates.' 48
137. See AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION, AM.
JUD. Soc'Y REP. No. 23 (1968); A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
oF COURT ORGANIZATION REFORM, AM. JuD. Soc'Y REP. No. 12 (1970).
138. New Jersey appears to have led the way, however, through its reorganiza-
tion scheme of 1947. For a description of New Jersey's efforts, see A. VANDERBILT,
THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 96-106 (1955).
139. For a discussion of the Illinois constitutional amendment which was adopted
by Illinois voters on Nov. 6, 1962, and whose judicial article became effective on
Jan. 1, 1964, see G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN AN-
NOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1969); H. FINS, ILLINOIS APPELLATE
PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION 3-13 (1973); Special Supplement-The
Blue Ballot Judicial Amendment, 50 ILL. B.J. 649 (1962). For a discussion of the
1970 Illinois Constitution and its effects on the state judicial system, see FINS, supra,
at 14-26; R. COHN, To JUDGE WITH JUSTICE: HISTORY AND POLITICS OF ILLINOIS
JUDICIAL REFORM (1973).
140. Compare note 119 supra with Appendix: House Joint Resolution 39, 50
ILL. B.J. 708, §§ 8, 12, at 709-10 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
141. Compare ILL, CONST. art. VI, § 16 with Appendix, supra note 140, § 2, at
708.
142. Compare ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 with Apendix, supra note 140, § 2, at
708.




The court system operating today in Illinois thus is markedly dif-
ferent in several key respects from the system established pursuant
to the 1962 Illinois Judicial Article. Undoubtedly the current Illinois
system will continue to undergo modification through a combination
of constitutional and statutory changes and court rules. The reality
of the Illinois experience thus reveals the concept to be one of an
evolving and a gradually changing nature.
Unification-A Meaningful Definition
As the preceding sections show, the phrases "unified court sys-
tem" and "court unification" are quite confusing in several major
ways. As they are now employed, the phrases refer to at least three
somewhat different concerns. Court unification, as it is now used,
may refer to the specific means of achieving certain goals relating
to the reform of state court systems; in this context, unification is
generally discussed in terms of models or standards. Use of the
phrase in this manner is exemplified in commentaries such as those
of the National Municipal League and the American Bar Association.
Court unification, as it is now used, may also refer to a type of court
system allegedly adopted through state constitutional and statutory
amendments relating to court organization and judicial administra-
tion. Use of the phrase in this manner is exemplified by the judicial
articles of such states as New York and North Carolina. Finally,
court unification, as it is now used, may refer to the gradual imple-
mentation of changes in a state's constitutional, statutory, and court-
made rules relating to court organization and judicial administration.
Use of the phrase in this manner is exemplified by a review of the
Illinois experience over the past ten years.
The authors' personal view on what is meant by the concept of
a unified court system incorporates all three of the aforementioned
concerns. We feel that the concept is not a rigid one; thus a single
model or a single set of standards seem to be an inappropriate way
of defining the concept. Rather, we feel that the concept is one
which is amenable to the peculiar local features of any one state;
and being so, the concept can take on varying forms as it is applied
to the unique circumstances of a state which decides to adopt its ra-
tionales and principles. The core of the concept's present meaning
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thus lies in its 'basic rationales and principles which may be applied
to all court systems.
The authors' notion as to the concept's meaning may be sum-
warized as follows:
1. The judicial system of an individual state necessarily con-
tains elements of court organization and judicial administra-
tion;
2. Court organization refers to the number of courts within the
judicial system, together with their territorial and subject
matter jurisdictions;
3. Judicial administration refers to the extent of centralized
administrative, supervisory, and/or managerial power exer-
cised over both the judicial and non-judicial personnel of
the court system;
4. The concept of a unified court system is concerned with im-
proving the elements of court organization and judicial ad-
ministration in all state judicial systems;
5. The concept embodies several major principles which are
the means by which these elements of any judicial system
can be improved;
6. Various rationales can be found to justify the promotion of
the concept's basic principles.
In the following section, the authors' notion as to which principles
are embodied in the concept will be examined together with their
rationales.
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE UNIFIED COURT CONCEPT
Traditional Rationales of the Unified Court Concept
As discussed previously, the unified court concept is essentially
concerned with the organizational and administrative elements of
state judicial systems. Although the manner in which the concept
has been used in this country since Pound's 190,6 speech is quite
confused, several basic themes appear throughout most commen-
taries dealing with the concept. Before examining the relationship
of these basic themes to the authors' notion of the concept's basic
principles, it first seems appropriate to review the general reasons
usually given in support of court unification,
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The motivations behind Roscoe Pound's initial call for unified
courts seem as relevant today as they were nearly 70 years ago.
Pound promoted court unification, in part, because of the con-
temporary "archaic" nature of American judicial organization and
procedure. The situation has not changed dramatically since then.
"Multiplicity of courts is characteristic of archaic law.' 1 44 Several
state court systems still are deficient in this respect. 45 In many
areas of the country today, a potential litigant discovers that he can
choose between the original jurisdiction of either a state court, a
county court or one of several municipal-based courts. And while
several of these courts may function under the general supervision
of their state supreme courts and/or state court administrators, others
do not. In some states, in fact, it is even impossible to ascertain
the names of those serving in judicial capacities-let alone gather
meaningful data on the volume of their court system's caseload, facil-
ities, finances, and similar matters.
146
Another characteristic of an archaic system according to Pound
was the preservation of concurrent jurisdictions.' 47  Pound believed
that all original jurisdiction should be concentrated. 148  Yet today
there are many states where a particular cause of action can be
brought in two, three, or even more different courts within the same
geographical area. This detracts and impairs the pursuit of eco-
nomic efficiency and equal justice.
Pound also decried as archaic the waste of judicial power caused
by: (1) "rigid districts or courts or jurisdictions," so that congestion
resulted in one court while judges in another sat idle; (2) the con-
sumption of court time with points of pure practice, with less judicial
144. Pound, supra note 2, at 62.
145. VANDERBILT, supra note 11l. For more recent information on the various
state court systems, see State Court Progress at a Glance, 56 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 427
(1973); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE/LEAA, PRELIMINARY REPORT: NATIONAL SURVEY
OF COURT ORGANIZATION 1971 (1972).
146. In the spring of 1973, the American Judicature Society undertook a major
study of American courts of limited and special jurisdiction. As part of the study,
the Society attempted to gather in various ways lists of all judges serving such
courts. The attempts failed in many states for such lists were simply unavailable
to officials of the state and local governments. Further information on this effort
is available from the Society's Research Department.
147. Pound, supra note 2, at 63.
148. Id. at 64.
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time devoted to the investigation of substantial controversies; and
(3) the nullification of the results of prior judicial action through
unnecessary retrials. 140 In one or more of these forms, much judicial
energy still is being wasted in many present state court systems.
The reasons behind the earliest A.B.A. official position on court
unification also seem as relevant today as when they were first intro-
duced. The first major A.B.A. action proposing unified courts came
in a 1909 special committee report and cited nine distinct advantages
of the unified court concept. Several of these "advantages" coin-
cided with Pound's earlier elaboration on the archaic American
courts.
One major advantage put forward by the A.B.A. report was that
unification
would bring about better supervision and control of administrative officers
connected with judicial administration, and make it possible to introduce
improved and more business-like methods in the making of judicial records
and the clerical work of the courts. 150
Three years earlier, Pound had recognized the need for more super-
vision over the court's administrative personnel. Furthermore,
Pound's later works on unification recognized the importance of judi-
cial control over such non-judicial personnel as clerks.'
Another advantage referred to by the report was that unification
"would allow judges to become specialists in the disposition of par-
ticular classes of litigation."' 52 The prevailing system of periodic ro-
tation of judges between civil trials with juries, equity causes and
criminal cases was described as unfortunate. 5 Pound later advo-
cated the employment of specialized judges, but not of specialized
courts.1
4
Unification, the report went on, would facilitate the development
of a true judicial department, eliminate waste in the utilization of ju-
dicial manpower, and do away with the bad practice of throwing
cases out of court only to be begun over again elsewhere. In addi-
tion, it was contemplated that unification would help to eliminate
149. Id.
150. 34 A.B.A. REP. 595 (1909).
151. Pound, supra note 112, at 230.
152. 34 A.B.A. Rep. 594 (1909).
153. Id. at 594-95.
154. Pound, supra note 112, at 231.
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much of the unnecessary expense involved in the transfer of cases
and the "unfortunate" innovations in the law of venue, avoid most
of the pitfalls of appellate procedure, and reconcile many of the con-
flicts between judges of coordinate jurisdictions.' 55 Such specific
benefits usually are not cited today. Support for court unification
usually is articulated in more abstract and general terms.
Since the early days of Pound and the A.B.A. Special Committee,
reasons given to support court unification have only been echoes and
refinements of the aforementioned reasons. Almost all of the cur-
rent calls for court unification stress the importance of centralized
supervision over administrative personnel, judicial personnel, and the
various business-type operations of the courts. They point out the
need for economic efficiency, equality of justice, and judicial inde-
pendence. Further clarification of reasons behind the movement to-
ward court unification probably can best be accomplished by examin-
ing the key principles of the unified court concept.
Principles of the Unified Court Concept
In the simplest terms, the principles can be viewed as the basic
and essential components of the concept of a modern unified court
system. However, this is not an adequate explanation. It seems
that the unified court concept can only be defined by its principles,
and there appears to be no single statement which can distinguish
unified systems from non-unified systems even after the principles
have been identified.
Viewing the notion of a unified court system simply as a concept
which contains certain principles dealing with court organization, ad-
ministration, and procedure, it is necessary to differentiate between
unified and non-unified court systems on the basis of those unifica-
tion principles inherent in any particular court system. Because many
state court systems contain some of the principles while lacking
others, there exist degrees of unification. Also, two state judicial
systems which can be characterized as unified may have two entirely
different court structures and modes of operation because they ad-
here to two different sets of unification principles. In short, it is
difficult to discern exactly where the line should be drawn when
155. 34 A.B.A. REP. 593-94 (1909).
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characterizing court systems as unified or non-unified. However, ac-
knowledging this ambiguity, a discussion of unified courts and their
underlying principles remains important. For reasons already men-
tioned, the principles of the unified court concept can help to allevi-
ate many problems facing the court systems of states which choose
to adopt them. And while certain unification principles may be in-
appropriate for individual states with peculiar local circumstances,
consideration of the following principles and of their potential im-
plementation seems to be a crucial step in all attempts to improve
the quality of justice being administered in each of these states.
There appear to be two types of principles of court unification
-those over which there has been little disagreement and those
over which there has been and presently is much controversy. We
shall start with an account of the former types for they are easier,
and then proceed to discuss the more controversial principles.
One of the basic principles consistently embodied in the unified
court concept over which there has been little disagreement centers
on the necessity for a simplified state court structure.'56 All propo-
nents of the unified court concept have underscored the need for
eliminating the myriad of minor courts which typically exist in a non-
unified system.157 While non-unified court systems vary in their
numbers and their types of limited and special jurisdiction courts,
generally they include a mixture of county-wide and municipal, vil-
lage or township courts.' 5" In this decade there still are some state
judicial systems that possess at least ten different kinds of courts be-
low their trial courts of general jurisdiction.' 59
The need for a simplified court structure is proposed in order to
eliminate many of the injustices and economic inefficiencies which
result from the proliferation of minor courts. Injustices often arise
because the limited jurisdiction courts usually are not supervised ade-
quately. Often these courts are not subject to the control of the state
156. See COURTS, supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164; STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.10, at 1-2.
157. Compare, e.g., Model State Judicial Article, supra note 66 with COURTS,
supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164 and STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 91, § 1.10, at 1-2.
158. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTicE/LEAA, PRELIMINARY REPORT: NATIONAL SURVEY OF




court administrator, and they are practically unknown to those hold-
ing executive responsibility for their states' entire court system. In
many states accurate listings of the names of judges serving in many
of these minor courts is not even available. 160
Economic inefficiencies arise partly because many of the minor
courts possess concurrent jurisdictions and because often there exists
the absolute right to de novo review of a minor court judge's decision.
Also, there is often a great imbalance in the workload among these
courts, with some minor court judges overburdened and other judges
holding similar positions underworked. What makes matters worse
in this last respect is that adequate avenues rarely exist for correcting
such imbalances; for example, few states provide for the temporary
assignment of limited jurisdiction court judges to courts other than
their own when the workload of the limited courts favors such a shift.
Proponents of the unified court concept have urged adoption of
a two,' three,162 and sometimes four'63 level court system. This
difference in the number of levels does not necessarily represent a
difference in the types of trial courts being proposed; for example,
a three-level court system may differ from a two-level system only
with respect to the independent nature of the intermediate appellate
court.' 64  The basic controversy between advocates of the unified
court concept centers on the value of a court of limited jurisdiction
within the unified court structure. Some persons argue for only one
general trial court, with divisions, subdivisions and/or branches ex-
clusively dealing in minor civil and criminal matters. 165 Others pro-
pose the establishment of both a state-wide court of general jurisdic-
tion and a state-wide court of limited jurisdiction.'
One state-wide trial court of general jurisdiction probably is all
that is required within a unified court system. However, under cer-
160. This is particularly true with respect to justices of the peace; the state of
Texas will exemplify the point if one attempts to learn of their justices' activities.
161. The Case for a Two-Level State Court System, 50 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 185
(1967).
162. Model Judiciary Article: Introduction, supra note 12, at 133.
163. 87 A.B.A. REP. 392 (1962).
164. The Case for a Two-Level State Court System, supra note 161, at 186;
STANDARDO OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.13, at 23-24.
165. CouRTs, supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164.
166. 87 A.B.A. REP. 392 (1962).
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tain circumstances, a state-wide limited jurisdiction court might func-
tion quite well and differ little from divisions of a single state-wide
trial court of general jurisdiction which handles only minor matters.
Consequently, it is possible for a system with two, three or even four
levels of courts to be characterized as having a simplified court struc-
ture. The key lies not in the number of courts handling cases but
in the state's method for handling cases brought before its courts.
A second basic principle usually embodied in the unified court
concept focuses upon the need for centralized supervision of both
a state's judicial and non-judicial court personnel.1 67  Responsibility
for such supervision can rest, in part, with the supreme court, 168 the
chief justice, 169 or with a council of judges."' What is important
is not who actually possesses such control, but rather whether such
supervisory power exists and ultimately is vested in the judiciary.
Centralized supervision of a state's courts under a unified system
helps to promote equality in the administration of justice within the
state. Such supervision includes uniform rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure; general rules on court administration; and provisions
for continuing educational programs. While complete uniformity
and absolute control is impossible and undesirable, a state's trial
courts should function wherever possible under similar sets of guide-
lines, rules and working conditions.
Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure are addressed primarily
to parties appearing before a state's courts. They are designed to
govern the presentation of individual cases.' While procedural
rules may vary to accommodate special local needs, a set of uniform
rules of procedure that are applicable state-wide as far as practical
is crucial to assure the even-handed administration of justice within
the state. The value of uniform rules has been described as follows:
[T]he value of uniform rules is very great. They establish standards of fair-
ness and efficiency to which all may look. They are guidelines for the
judges, directives and authorizations for auxiliary court personnel, and au-
thoritative references for the lawyers. They are a check on favoritism, cor-
ruption, and local prejudice. Their formulation involves deliberations in
167. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.32, at 57.
168. Id.
169. 87 A.B.A. REP. § 8, at 397-98 (1962).
170. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.32, at 57.
171. Id. at 8.
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which all relevant interests, objectives and constraints may be taken into
account. They apply the principle that government should be of law, rather
than men, even in the administration of justice itself.' 72
Rules on court administration include general guidelines for the
work of both judicial and non-judicial court personnel. For ex-
ample, under the unified court concept, judicial personnel should be
subject to possible temporary assignments to other courts throughout
the state, to general uniform rules on such matters as docketing and
calendaring, and to possible service on or consultation with judicial
councils and/or conferences.
The employment by a state's court system of non-judicial per-
sonnel should be subject to uniform standards governing recruitment,
hiring, removal, compensation, and training. 173 Non-judicial officers
should be guided by uniform rules promulgated by a central adminis-
trative authority on such matters as accounting and auditing proce-
dures, collection and dissemination of court statistics, and budgeting
requests. Supervisory responsibility for the court's non-judicial per-
sonnel in a unified system usually is delegated to a state court ad-
ministrator. 174
Centralized supervision might also entail compulsory state-wide
training programs for both judicial and non-judicial personnel. Such
programs provide a convenient means of communicating general
court policy. In addition to their educational value, they reinforce
a sense of common purpose among a court system's staff. 175
Effective supervision of a state's court system requires a proper
balance between central control and individual autonomy. The bal-
ance will differ in each state, depending upon local traditions, popu-
lation, history, terrain, and politics. However, a unified state court
system always will contain a high degree of centralized authority
which commands the respect and loyalty of a large number of local
judicial units.
A third basic principle of the unified court concept is state assump-
tion of all or a substantial part of the financial responsibility for the
172. id. at 9.
173. CouRTS, supra note 105, standard 9.1, at 176.
174. Id. at 176-79.
175. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, at 9.
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state court system. Such an arrangement has been justified as fol-
lows:
Financing by local government leads to fragmented and disparate levels
of financial support, particularly for auxiliary court services; to direct in-
volvement of the judiciary in local politics; to rigidity and very often par-
simony in provision of needed resources; and to divided and ineffective ef-
forts to make use of the increasing level of financial grants to state govern-
ment that are being provided by the federal government. Dispersion of fi-
nancial responsibility and financial management tends also to disperse re-
sponsibility for administration and policy, so that the court system cannot
be operated according to uniform procedures and standards even when this
is attempted through administrative policy and supervision. 170
Currently there is little or no dispute over inclusion of these three
basic principles in the unified court concept. Disagreements do arise
concerning the proper limits to which such principles should apply.
For example, there is some disagreement over the value of a state-
wide court of limited jurisdiction and over the meaning of "non-
judicial" personnel (i.e., should it include personnel in pretrial re-
lease, probation or other rehabilitative services177).
At times other principles for the unified court concept have been
proposed, but they appear to be inappropriate for inclusion. One
such principle concerns the manner of judicial selection and reten-
tion.178 Although the quality of judicial personnel may be the cru-
cial factor in determining whether the implementation of the unifica-
tion principles proves successful, it is incorrect to assume that only
a certain manner of selecting or retaining judges will provide the fi-
nancial, administrative or structural ingredients necessary to success-
fully unify a state court system. One particular scheme of judicial
selection and tenure is thus not a basic tenet of court unification.
Nor is the specific jurisdiction of the unified trial court crucial to
successful court unification. Although at least one major study has
concluded that, in a unified state court system, certain traffic viola-
tions should be placed under the jurisdiction of a state administrative
agency, 179 it cannot be said that such a limitation is necessary to as-
176. Id. at 73.
177. COURTS, supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164; Note, Administration of
Pretrial Release and Detention: A Proposal for Unification, 83 YALE L.J. 153, 177
(1973).
178. See STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.10, at 1;
cf. Pound, supra note 112, at 233.
179. COURTS, supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164 and standard 8.2, at 168.
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sure the successful achievement of the goals of the unified court con-
cept. For example, the unified trial courts in Illinois have handled
traffic violations for over ten years and there is no indication of any
future change. While the unified court concept contains sufficient
flexibility to include or exclude almost any type of case deemed ap-
propriate by the state legislature, the unified state court system must
have the jurisdictional authority of its courts defined in a uniform
way, so that all courts at each level in the system have identical ju-
risdiction.""0
A third principle associated with the concept of court unification
mentioned by others, but distinguished here, concerns the types and
qualifications of judicial officers serving in state trial courts. For ex-
ample, one study has concluded that, in a unified state court system,
"all judicial functions in the trial courts should be performed by full-
time judges" '' and "all judges should possess law degrees and be
members of the bar."' 82 Still another study has indicated in its gen-
eral discussion of the general principles of court unification that the
judicial functions of the trial court should be performed by
a single class of judges, assisted by legally trained judicial officers (commis-
sioners, associate judges, magistrates and similar officials) assigned to such
matters as preliminary hearings, non-criminal traffic cases, small claims,
and responsibilities usually discharged by lower court judges, referees, or
hearing officers. 1
8 3
Neither study seems to focus on the relevant issues. The objectives
of a unified court system appear to be attainable with or without the
use of parajudicial officers in the trial courts so long as centralized
supervision by other judicial officers is maintained. 84
THE UNIFIED COURT CONCEPT AND THE FUTURE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The principles of the unified court concept have played and will
continue to play a major role in the attempts to reform the organiza-
tion and administration of various state court systems. However, the
significance of the concept's future role will vary from state to state
180. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.11, at 2.
181. COURTS, supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164.
182. Id.
183. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 91, § 1.10, at 2.
184. PARNESS, supra note 98.
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depending upon the manner chosen by each state to implement the
principles, if any, and upon which principles each state chooses to
emphasize.
Factors Relating to the Variation in Significance of the Unified
Court Concept from State to State
Even though the concept of the unified court system will play
some role in the individual states' continual efforts to re-evaluate and
improve their court systems, the variations in the degree of attention
which the states will pay to the concept depend upon several factors
which are unique to each of the states.
One such factor influencing the concept's future impact in any one
state is the level at which the state has already achieved all or some
of the concept's several major principles. In a sense, the unified
court concept and its principles compete in every state with other
concepts and principles also designed to help in improving the state's
court system. They also compete for consideration with pro-
posed reforms in non-judicial areas. If a state has adopted many
of the unification principles, the impetus for adoption and/or ex-
tension of further unification principles may be slowed. This would
be particularly likely in states where major problems with the court
system exist but are unrelated to the areas of court organization or
judicial administration.
Another factor affecting the concept's impact on any one state is
a state's demographic features. For example, centralization of su-
pervisory -authority may be achieved more easily in smaller, denser
areas than in larger, sparsely settled areas. However, Alaska
stands out as an exception to this observation. A state's court system
also must be flexible with respect to its organization and procedure
to operate effectively where a certain segment of the state has a
unique demographic feature. For example, a locality may have a
sharply varying population because of its tourist industry, or it may
have a specialized residential body such as a community of older,
retired families or a college community. An effectively organized
court system must also take into account the state's physical terrain.
The elimination of limited jurisdiction courts where travel between
various population centers is difficult and/or involves rather lengthy
distances is a different problem from that concerning the elimination
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of limited courts in a state where intrastate travel generally is quite
easy.
Political, cultural, and/or historical features of a state make up yet
another factor to be considered. It may be easier to achieve uni-
formity of judicial procedure and centralization of supervisory powers
in states where the population is more homogeneous in their politi-
cal and cultural attitudes. For example, public opinion in many
areas of the country generally is sympathetic to the idea of local con-
trol, and associates centralization of any governmental power with
such evils as massive bureaucracy, red tape, and corruption. Effec-
tuating unification principles also may be easier to accomplish in
states with less of a tradition of local government independence from
state government.
A final factor affecting the significance of court unification in the
process of re-evaluating and reforming the state court system is the
balance of government power in the state. The strength of the state
court system vis-a-vis the other branches of state government is im-
portant. But also important are the extent and nature of locally fi-
nanced courts within the state (compared to state financed courts),
the strength of the state's municipal and county governments, and
the state supreme court's view of its own constitutional, statutory, and
inherent powers.
As the above mentioned factors show, the individual states may
vary widely with respect to the significance of the unified court con-
cept. There are great differences between the states regarding the
future importance of the unified court concept. Furthermore, there
are likely to be sharp differences in the reasons why individual states
fail to adopt or to even consider many or any of the unification prin-
ciples.
Variation in the Focal Point of States Implementing
Principles of Court Unification
Once a state legislature and/or judiciary decide that the concept
and principles of unification are significant, the central issue becomes
which principle or principles will be implemented to improve the op-
eration of the state's court system. States will doubtless continue
to differ as to which aspects of the unification concept merit atten-
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tion. These differences will arise, in large part, because of the varia-
tion in the states' balancing of the factors mentioned earlier which
affect the significance of the concept from state to state.
For example, the factor concerning the level or degree to which
a state has achieved unification will help determine which principles
are to be focused on in the future. A state whose court structure
is quite complicated will probably initially concentrate on creating
a new, simplified structure. Texas serves as a good illustration;
there is a strong push in that state today to eliminate many of that
state's limited courts. For a state with numerous types of limited
courts, the chances of establishing a centralized supervisory power
which can effectively manage all the state's courts is quite remote.
However, this is not always the case. New Jersey has been very
active in developing an effective supervisory system over the state's
judges since 1947, yet its court structure has remained quite com-
plex throughout.
The factor relating to the division of power between the branches
of the state government, as well as to the relative strength of the
various local governments, will also affect the determination of which
principles are to be future focal points. This factor will particularly
influence decisions made concerning what changes, if any, are to oc-
cur in the area of court financing. State assumption of responsibility
for financing the entire court system is often opposed by local gov-
ernments because court-generated revenues might become lost for
local treasuries. Thus, the extent of power held by local govern-
mental authorities and the degree to which it can be used to influ-
ence state legislative actions and proposed constitutional amend-
ments may be the crucial issue in any reform effort aimed at a court
system's financing structure.
Variation in the Manner of Implementing the Principles
of Court Unification
Once a state legislature and/or judiciary decide that a certain de-
ficiency exists in the operation of the state's court system and decide
that implementation of a principle or principles of the unified court
concept is the best means of eliminating that deficiency, the central




There are several ways in which principles of court unification can
be implemented. The way chosen will depend heavily on some of
the uniquely local factors already alluded to. It is possible to charac-
terize a state court system with either two, three, or four tiers as em-
bodying the principle of a simplified court structure. But factors of
demography and balance of government powers will be important
in any state's decision to establish a two, three, or four tier court
system.
Centralized supervision over a state's entire court system has been
cited as another principle of the unified court concept. Such ad-
ministrative power over the so-called unified court system of New
York is located in the Administrative Board of the Judicial Confer-
ence, while such power under the Illinois unified system lies with
its supreme court. In California, where the court system is not con-
sidered unified, much supervisory power over the state's trial courts
is exercised by the Judicial Council. In each state, the important
aspects regarding supervision are that, first, it is occurring; second, the
responsibility for the entire system is centralized; and, third, supervi-
sion is exercised primarily by members of the court system.
Thus the need for implementing the principles of the unified court
concept is not really based on such necessities as having only a cer-
tain number of courts in the system or having only a certain source
of all supervisory powers. Rather, the need for implementing the
principles is really the need for a state court system to achieve certain
desired results. The adoption of the principles of the unified court
concept in any suitable manner helps to promote the cause of a more
efficient and effective state court system. Clearly, there are several
different paths to follow in this respect and they all can lead to the
promotion of the cause.
Variation in the Extent to Which the Principles of Court
Unification are Implemented
Once it is decided to implement a certain principle of court unifi-
cation in a certain manner, the final question concerns the extent
to which the principle should be carried. States which decide to im-
plement one of the aforementioned unification principles in a partic-
ular manner may still differ in the extent to which they decide the
principle is to be implemented. For example, several states which
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claim to have simplified their system's court structure still have sub-
stantially dissimilar types of courts. One state decided to maintain
only one form of trial court, while another maintained two. But a
third state has maintained at least five trial courts. These differ-
ences do not necessarily indicate that any of these states has failed
to achieve the goals of a simplified court structure. However, a
closer examination of those states which claim to have simplified
their court structure indicates that at least some of them recognized
their failure to fully simplify their court system's structure. For some
of these states, then, the recent structural reforms constitute only a
step in the movement toward a completely unified court structure.
Also, where the principle of centralized supervision over judicial
and non-judicial personnel has been implemented recently, the de-
gree of the supervision itself and its form varies from one state to
another. State court administrators have set up different schemes
for budgeting, recordkeeping, recruitment of non-judicial personnel,
and the like.
The question of the extent to which any of the unification prin-
ciples should be extended appears to be one which can never be
finally settled. In truth, the question probably will remain part of
the concern of those who continually reassess the role and perform-
ance of various state court systems and who are thus forever search-
ing for means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of those
systems. States like Illinois, which have implemented all of the ma-
jor principles of the unified court concept, must continue to evaluate
the limits to which they will apply the principles. However lauda-
tory Illinois' efforts toward unification may be, the state still must
resolve important questions with respect to the dimensions of the
concept and its principles.
For example, initial decisions were made in Illinois concerning the
nature -of its unified itrial court. These decisions have been re-eval-
uated and altered as conditions have warranted. With respect to
the principle of centralized supervision, Illinois continues to redefine
its ideas on the meaning of such terms we have used as supervision,
judicial personnel and non-judicial personnel. In this context, the
following types of questions arise: Does the unified trial court need
additional non-judicial and/or judicial positions; should the court, by
its own action, create parajudicial positions; and should the courts
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bring new forms of non-judicial personnel such as marriage counsel-
lors under their centralized supervision? Decisions on these kinds
of questions must be made initially, and must be continually re-eval-
uated. Also, with respect to court financing, the balance in Illinois
between local and state funding receives constant review and re-
assessment.
CONCLUSION
The significance of the unified court concept for the future dis-
position of justice in America seems quite clear. The concept will
continue to play a crucial role in all attempts to reform the structure,
organization, and administration of the various American court sys-
tems because the applications of the principles of court unification
are essential to the achievement of efficient and just systems. The
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection man-
date such applications.
However, in assessing the future relevance of the concept and
its principles, states must be extremely cautious not to apply too nar-
row or too rigid a construction to the court unification concept. In
the past, too many states and too many commentators have dis-
cussed and applied the concept in its most limited terms. In the
future, the concept of the unified court system should be viewed as
containing elements of both flexibility and gradual implementation.
States should continue to employ the unification concept in their at-
tempts to improve the operation of their court systems by continuing
to redefine and apply the concept's set of general principles dealing
with court organization and judicial administration.
The focus of this Article until now has been on the concept of a
unified court system and on its importance in the reformation of state
court systems. As it has been defined, the concept is concerned with
the elements of court organization and judicial administration.' 8 5
The authors feel the time will soon come to move from consideration
of the concept of a unified court system to consideration of a concept
involving a unified judicial system. While the distinction may at first
seem semantic, the authors feel the difference is crucial. The
change in focus would allow a much more expansive construction
to be given to the aforementioned element of judicial administration.
185. See text, Unification-A Meaningful Definition, pp. 23-24 supra.
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The element of judicial administration has been said to refer to
"the extent of centralized administrative, supervisory, and/or man-
agerial power exercised over both the judicial and non-judicial per-
sonnel of the court system."'' s6 It is the last phrase in this descrip-
tion of judicial administration which necessitates a change in focus.
While the unified court concept contemplates centralized supervision
by the judiciary of such non-judicial court personnel as clerks, ste-
nographers, and reporters, the concept of a unified judicial system
would allow judicial supervision to be expanded to include such non-judicial, court-related personnel as probation or parole officers, ju-
venile counsellors, and prison officials. The decisions as to whether
to expand the judiciary's supervision, the degree of such supervision,
and who in the judiciary will undertake the actual supervision must
of course be made individually by each state on an individual basis.
But moving toward a concept of the unified judicial system would
extend the dimension of the dialogue and the possibilities for
broader application of the unification principles.
Such a shift in the meaning of the concept would facilitate a more
system-oriented approach with respect to state court systems. A
state judicial system is composed of more than a number of courts.
It consists of all the various institutions which the courts utilize prior
to, during, and after court decisions are made. Consideration of the
concept of a unified judicial system would justify application by the
judiciary of the unification principles of centralized supervision to
court-related institutions. Court-related institutions include jails;
state prisons; pretrial diversion centers dealing with such matters as
rehabilitation of alcoholics, drug addicts, and juvenile offenders or
delinquents; probation offices; parole boards; prison disciplinary
boards; compulsory and voluntary arbitration panels; conciliation bu-
reaus; pretrial detention centers; and so-called "community
moots.'9
1 8 7
The authors feel that centralized judicial supervision of some of
these court-related institutions would not present an undue burden
for the judiciary and would not present a separation of powers prob-
lem. It is not anticipated that members of the judiciary would run
186. See text, p. 24 supra.
187. Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System
of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45 (1973).
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the prisons on a day-to-day basis, or even serve on the regular court-
sponsored arbitration panels. Rather, the judiciary would oversee
the operations of some of the court-related institutions to assure that
uniform rules, procedures, and practices are employed wherever pos-
sible and as often as possible throughout the state for people sub-
stantially in similar positions.'l8  Constitutional due process and
equal protection guarantees require no less, and have been used
in litigation aimed at obtaining such oversight.
Extension of the court unification concept's notion of centralized
supervision has been alluded to in at least one recent major commen-
tary. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Stand-
ards and Goals stated the following about court unification in one
of its reports: "Pretrial release services, probation services, and
other rehabilitative services should be available in all prosecutions
within the jurisdiction of the unified trial court."'8 9  In subsequent
commentary the Commission's report stated:
Not only are present provisions for pretrial services for lower courts inade-
quate, but the general lack of coordination among different courts in regard
to pretrial release matters has unfortunate consequences for those charged
with offenses as well as for the general public. 190
Other commentators have pointed out the possibility of judicial
supervision over non-judicial, court-related personnel who operate in
court-related institutions.' 9'
In essence, court unification is an evolutionary concept which can
never be defined in absolute terms. At most, it is a concept whose
general principles can be of enormous aid in any attempts at reform-
ing state court systems.
188. Obviously, local experimentation and differences due to peculiar local needs
would be accommodated. See text, Factors Relating to the Variation in Significance
of the Unification Concept from State to State, pp. 34-35 supra.
189. COURTS, supra note 105, standard 8.1, at 164.
190. id., standard 8.1 commentary, at 166.
191. See Danzig, supra note 187; Note, Administration of Pretrial Release and
Detention, supra note 177; PARNESS, supra note 98.
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